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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

GEORGE M. WHITELEY,
Plaintiff and R·espondent,
vs.
JOHN DeVRIES, BARBARA D·eVRIES, HARRY L. BARNUM, '
STREVELL- pATERSON FINANCE CORPORATION.
De fend;a;nts,
1

No. 7314

M. L. EWEL.L, doing business as
Ewell Plumbing and Heating,
Defendant I{}Jnd Appellant

BRIEF OF AP'PELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This iS' an ap·peal by the defendant Ewell from a
judgment foreclosing 't~o mortgages given by the defendants De Vries to the plaintiff Whiteley and foreclosing as a mortgage a Warranty D·eed given by the deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
fendants DeV:rjes to the p1laintiff Whiteley for a consideration of $60().00- :and subordinating- _.Ewell's lien for
labor and materrals to the lien of the two mortgages
above referre.d. to. The d~fendant-Ewell_has appealed.
The Complaint of the plaintiff is in thre·e caus·es of
action, the first two being for the foreclosure of notes
and mortgages dated March lOth and April 15, 1947 for
$4,000.00 and $1,000.00 respectively,· and the· third cause
of action to declare ·the· Warranty D·eed -given by the
defendants DeVries to plaintiff under date of ·JUly 31,
1947 to be a mortg~ge to secure:·a loan:of$600.00Jmade
by the plaintiff to the defe·ndants D.eVries· at 1fu.atrtime.
. No ;·note was ta~en _by :tk.e- plaintiff·:to -evidence the
claimed loan of $600.00 at the time of the-delivery,of the
Warranty Dee~ (Tr.:·.P·;M). A documentary s'tamp was
attached to the Deed and it was recorded on the same
day of its date, July 31, 1947 (Exhibit "'C").
I

On June 25, 1947 defendant Ewell had entered into
a contract with the DeVries to 'do·the plumbing work on
the buildings then being constructed on the premises in
question and betwe·en Jun·e 27th and ·July 2B, 1947 had
p·erformed l~b.or ~d ·supp,lied (lnaterial in the performance of the work to the value of $724.57 (Exhibit 1).
Up to that time he had received no money on account
and he refused to _proceed further (Record p·. 108).
About that time Mr. Gaddis, who was the fin'ancial
:ag.ent for .rthe plaintiff .(Record p. 101), called the· plaintiff:-and.·ask~d to know if-he, the plaintiff, would be interested :in Jatting .D·eVries have .$600.00 ·more so that .he
can g~t-the j-ob finishe·d.(Record pp. 124-5). ..The plaintiff
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3
met De\-r ries and Gaddis on the job and DeVries told
him that the plumber Ewell would not go any further
unless he had $600.00, and if plaintiff would let him have
$600.00 more he would give him a Warra~ty D·ee~d for
for the property. Mr. Gaddis said, ''We'll take a deed
to this property from you if Whiteley will let you ha:\lie
the $600.00, and at the end of sixty days if you pick
up the $600.00 you can have the D·eed back and then the
two first and second mortgages will rid-H.'' ( R·ecord p.
126). E\\Tell was not present at this conversation.
Later, probably July 31st, D·eVries came into Gaddis's office and Gaddis told him, "Mr. Whiteley demands a Warranty Deed to the prop,erty if he gives you
this third loan of $600.00. '' (Record p. 101). Mr. DeVries
gave Whiteley the deed which was immediately recorded
and Whiteley gave Gaddis the check for $600.00 for
Ewell to return 'to work and complete the job. He told
Mr. Gaddis to pay the plumber and se-e that the work was
done (Record p. 127).
~fr.

Ewelf did return to the job and from July 31,
1947 until August 22, 1947 he performed additional work
and supplied additional materials of a value of $1838.96,
making a total of $2,463.53 on which only $600.00 had
been paid (Exhibit 1). Mr. Ewell's claim of lien (Exhibit
2) was for an unpaid balance of $1,514.75, this amount
being based upon 'the original contract price for the work
to be done by him.
DeVries abandoned the prop·erty after paying
Whiteley some $50.00 on the obligations and without
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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paying Whiteley the $(300.00 and picl9ng_ up the Warrant~ DeeQ..
In the, judgmen.t the co;qrt declared the lien of the
mortgages for $4~000.00 and $1,000.00 with interest and
a~to:r:n~y'.s f:ee~.;to be pTior:to the_clairo of the· defendant
E_well and in effect held the defendant Ewell's claim to
h~. prior .to the._ pla,intiff~s .-claim. on the_alleged loa~ of
$(>QO.OO (Reco:rd.
pp.. 65-·()).
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STATEMENT OF ERR 0RS R.ELIED UPON
1

1. The trial court erred in making Finding of Fact
No. 11 (Tr. p. 58) wherein the.courtfound that the Warranty Deed was in fact a third ·mortgage to secure the
payment of $·600.00;
·2.·· 'The trial· court erred -in Finding of Fact No.
10 (Tcr. p. 58) that plaintiff's lien i~ paramount and sup·erior to the liens. and claims of ·all other d·e.fendants in
this action as ·to the first an·d s·e-cond caus·es of action.

3. The trial court erred in overruJ.i.ng th~ objections of the defendant to the conclusions and irrevelant
and -immate.rial questions obj·ecte·d to by the defendant
to the questions asked the witnes'S Gaddis.
4. The trial court erred in refusing to strike the
conclusions of the witness Gaddis· relative to the nature
of the transaetion, which motions were made by the defendant.
5.- The 'trial ·court ·erred · in entering judgment
against ·this defendant.
6. The . trial, court ·erred in dEfnying defendant's
motion for a new,~rial.,
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ARGUMENT
The Trial C·ourt Erred in Making Finding Of
Fact No's. 10 and 11 Subordmat'ilng Defe(Y/)aant's
Lien T~o Plaintiff's Mortgages.
The evidence in this case is clear that. the plaintiff
\vas desirous_ of getting the motor court ·completed .and
r~uested-and induced Ewell to complete the work. The
plaintiff knew on July·.31st and before that Ewell had
already-done-considerable work on the p~roperty and·th·at
he. had· refused to continue unle~ss he was. paid at least
$600.00.. In·. order to -induce Ewell to continu·e the work
he gave, Gaddis, his own agent, $600.00 for: the -purpose,
with instructions to p·ay it to Ewell and continue the
work and took from DeVries a Warranty Deed to the
prop~rty in que~tion with an agre.ement, of" which Ewell
had no knowle·dge, that he would :give the deed back to
DeVries if DeVries paid him $600.00 within sixty days..
Under the circumstances the. situation .is such that
the work in effect was done at the plaintiff's request
and in order for him, the plaintiff, to obtainthe benefit
of the work already done and the work to be done
1.

there~after.

This Court has. held in the case of The -Gary-Lombard
Lumber Company v. Thomas W. F(J)rtridg·e, 10 Utah 322,
37 Pac. 572 that a lien will atta:ch to a later interest acquired by one who authorizes work.. 'The C·ourt said:
''Such lien under the statute may also be extended to. any other or greater interest which
such owner may acquire to such property thereafter, and before the lien is. established. by process of law.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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6
A case which seems to he most nearly in point on the
facts with the cas·e at bar is that of liitncolm v. Hamilt,on
et ·al, 198 N. W. 289, decide.d by the Supreme Court of
Minneso't:a on April 11, 19·24. In this case the Van ·sant
Trust Company, who claimed to be a mortgagee, ap;..
pealed from a decision of t'he lower court holding that its
mortgage was subordinate to that of a lien claimant.
The trust ·company had forclos·ed a mortgage but the
period of redemption had not exp;ired. Plain!tiff entered
into a contract with a representative of the mortgagor
to remodel a home. The trust company assented to the
work. The court, in affirming the decision of the lower
court, said :
''There can be no doubt rut all that both defendant and Hamilton assented to the in1provement. A question is made as to whether the former
is. an 'owner' of the premis.es within the meaning
of the mechanic's lien statute. We think that it is.
To he an owner within the meaning of this statute
does not require absolute ownership. Benjamin
v. Wilson, 34 Minn. 517, 26 N. W. 725. It is there
pointed out that an owner is ordinarily 'one having dominion over a thing.' No one had so much
dominion over the real estate in question as def·endant Van Sant Company. The title records
indicated that it was the absolute owner. Upon
the record before us, admirably reduced to its
lowest terms by the finding, defendant eannot
be permitted now to assert that it is not the owner
so as to relieve the property of plaintiff's lien.
Whe~e the legal title to real es,tlat.e is in the mortgagee who assents t:o an improvement, his title
is subject to the lien arising from the i!Jnprovement.'' (Italics ours).
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Another cas.e which supports the Appellant's posiiton
is that of JQvne8 ·v •. · Mawsorn-Feterson Ilumber ·Gompawy,
· 150 Pae. (2d)' 795 decided by :the Supreme Court of. Colorado July· 3, 1944. In· this cas-e· the Lumber Company
furnished ·lun1ber to -build .a, garage to one ()sbo·rn.e: who
·had a lease on the. property. A -Mrs. Siltamaki furnish·ed
. ,the:money to- Osborne for the- building. ·The evidence ·was
in conflict as to-whether or not Mrs-.: Siltamaki auth·Q.pized
.the·. woFk. ~.The material·was~ furnished: during the -month
. jof July. In October Mrs. Siltamaki acqtrlredth·e- fee sim. :ple. title .. ·.The court at page 797 says -the following:
''That Mrs. ·siltamaki ·had· ·an interest to
which the lien·~ would\· attach is: supported by the
following cases: .C.aty· Hardware Co. v. McCarty,
10 Colo. App. 200, 50 P. 744, wherein it was held
. that: if ·a party -making -i:tnprovements on realty
holds- .possession' of the land under ~-a lease, or by
virtue of a license where its authority is coupled
. wfth- an ·interest, snch· party· is the ·owner of the
land within the me-chanic's Jien act. _. _Horn v. Clark
Hardware Co., 54 Colo. 522, 131 P. 405, 45 L.R.A.,
N. S., 100. See, also, H·o:tne Public ~-Market' Co. v.
Fallis, 72 Colo. -48, 209 P. 641, -in which we held
that an option' for a· lease ·-which·, later ripened into
a ninety-nine :year le-ase• was sufficient ownership
on which .the lien would- attaclh, and--Bankers' B .
.-&'L. Ass'n v.--Fleming'Bros.--Luniber_. Co., \83 Colo.
335, 264 p. 1087:"

·2. -'The Trial Oou.ft ·Erred ''In N/J·t . 8ii;S~a·1Jh;,ing Defenmant1' s 'Objections '.And-.'MlJt~ons To Strike The
Evidence Of The Witvness Gaddis.

at

is clear

from·.the.·reeord~that-mos-t;of,the
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8
sactions were handled for Whiteley by Mr. Gaddis of the
real estate company as agent for Whiteley. AS' to the
nature of the DeVries ·deed, all of Gaddis' testimony
are conclusion 'of the witness and what his understanding
was. All of this evidence was objected to or motions to
strike were made. This evidence was necessary to show
that the warranty deed was in fact a mortgage. It is our
position that if this p;urported evidence had been excluded the plaintiff failed to show what he contends was
the nature of the tran'Saction. As an illustration of the
conclusions of the witness Gaddis: we cite the following in
the record, (Record pp. 89-90).
'' Q. And did you consult with Mr. Whiteley concerning this additional loan~
''A. He ~agr"<eed to let them have six hundred dollars
if they would let him have a warranty deed.

'' Q. Did he .tell you that he would take the deed
only as security?
''A.

That is right.

''Q. And Mr. and Mrs. DeVries, when you talked
to them, did they understand that?·
''A.

They understood they we:ve to give security for
the six hundred dollars.

"Q. . It :w~asn 't intefnde~d as a transf·er of the lee
(f·ee)
·in the property was it?
...
~.

''A. It was not.''
A motion was made to strike all of the testimony
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of Gaddis relating to the condition under which the de·e·d
was given (Record pp. 97-99). This motion was denied
by the court. At no place did Mr. Gaddis testify as to
a conversation which would show the intent of the parties
when the deed was given. Everything said by him was
his conclusion.
Section 132 of 36 A me~ Jwrisprudence, page 754
. provides:
' '·The mutu·al intention of the parties to an
instrument which is absolute on its face, that such
instrument should operate as -a mortgage, must be
shown by direct evidence or by the circumstances
of the case. • • * • ''
The burden is on th.e person ass·erting that ·a deed
is in fact a mortgage.
Section 133 of 36 Americam Jurispnuience, ·pages
754-755 provides :
''There is authority in support of a presumption that an absolute conveyance with a covenant
of warranty and with-out a defeasance either· in
the conveyance or in a collateral instrument is
what it p·urports to be. In any event, the authoriites are unanimously agreed that the burden of
introducing evidence to prove that an absolute
conveyance, unaccompanied by ·any written stipulation for reconveyance, was intended to operate
·as a mortgage rests on th·e party alleging that
intention. ' '
In this case upon the execution of the warranty deed
no note evidencing the obligation was giv~ nor was there
any written agreement for reconve·yance. It appears
affirmatively that revenue stamp~s were ·attached to the
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deed and it was recorded. No reven~e stamp~s are required for the recordation of a mortgage. Without the
conclusions of the witness Ga:ddis there is no competant
evidence which would sustain the burden of proof imposed· upon the plaintiff. We submit that the evidence
should have been excluded and that it was reversable
error on the part of the court not to do so.
C0NCLUSION
1

We submit that the plaintiff and his agent by their
conduct subordinated the mortgage lien, if any, to the
mechanic's lien of the defendant Ewell. The plaintiff did
not sustain the burden of ·establishing that the warranty
deed given was in fact a mortgage. 'The judgm·ent of the
trial court should be reversed an~d the lien of the defendant Ewell be declared paramount to the lien of the
plaintiff.
Respectfully sub~tted,
c.RITCHLOW, WATS.ON and W ARNO;CK

Attorneys fOr

Aippel~(J!J'tt

M. L. Ewell
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